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Abstract
The US has legislated to abolish its social security earnings test. A priori it is not
possible to predict the effect this will have on work incentives. Using data from the
Family Expenditure Survey we show that the abolition of the earnings rule in the UK
increased the number of hours worked by men. The lack of any evidence of a
reduction in hours may be a consequence of those who previously earned more than
the earnings threshold deferring pension receipt at an actuarially favourable rate. This
is consistent with there being little evidence of a significant change in the number of
deferrals after the earnings rule was abolished.
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Summary
Before 1989 men aged 65-69 and women aged 60-64 earning above a certain
threshold would have their state pension reduced. This ‘earnings test’ was abolished
in October 1989 with the intention of encouraging employment. As other OECD
countries consider a similar reform, this paper examines the impact on participation,
hours and earnings in the UK.
A priori the effect on work incentives is ambiguous. Some workers who are currently
earning at or near the earnings threshold are likely to increase their hours. But for
other workers who currently defer their pension at an actuarially unfair rate,
abolishing the earnings test will cause their lifetime wealth to increase, which could
lead them to reduce the number of hours worked. The size of this wealth effect
depends on whether or not the deferral rate is actuarially fair.
A simple differences in differences analysis is used to show that abolishing the
earnings test had a positive effect on the hours and earnings of men, although the
evidence for women is inconclusive. Among men there was an increase of between 3
– 4 hours per week. To get some idea of the magnitude of this effect, an earnings
response of this size would generate additional tax revenue for the government of
around £20 million per year (in 1989 prices). The evidence suggests that the absence
of a positive wealth effect working in the other direction is because the majority of
those who previously chose to defer their pension continue to do so.3
The abolition of the earnings rule for UK pensioners
Introduction
Many OECD countries operate earnings tests which restrict the amount of pension
that can be received by people who continue to work past the pensionable age (see
Table 1). These tests often involve reductions in benefits at high effective withdrawal
rates for those whose earnings exceed a certain threshold.  At the same time, however,
many countries permit individuals to defer receipt of their social security pension after
the first age at which they are entitled to receive benefits.  By so doing, individuals
gain additional pension entitlements, although not always at an actuarially fair rate.
Table 1  Earnings Tests in OECD countries
Disregard
















United States 38 33-50
No restrictions
Finland France Germany
Netherlands New Zealand Sweden
Switzerland UK
Notes: Pension receipt in Ireland, Portugal and Spain conditional on withdrawal from work; France
conditional on withdrawal from normal work.  Pension withdrawn at a 100 per cent rate between 29
and 33 per cent of average earnings in Belgium.  Italy gives a higher disregard for self-employment
incomes (which are an important income source).  Australia has a means-tested social security system.
Source: Disney and Edward Whitehouse (1999).4
With the trend towards early retirement in many OECD countries there has been some
debate as to whether abolishing these earnings tests can encourage participation
among older workers. The US has recently legislated to abolish its social security
earnings test with this aim. However, the effect on work incentives is a priori
ambiguous. Some workers who are currently earning at or near the earnings threshold
are likely to increase their hours. But for other workers who currently defer at an
actuarially unfair rate, abolishing the earnings test will cause their lifetime wealth to
increase, which could lead them to reduce the number of hours worked.
A number of US studies carried out a decade or so ago, summarised in John Gruber
and Peter Orszag (1999), found little evidence of an impact on the earnings test on
labour supply. More recently, Leora Friedberg (1997) has examined the impact of the
test utilising the temporal variation in effective tax rates, age coverage and exemption
limits as a ‘natural experiment.’ She found that the test had a significant adverse
impact on hours worked by older men. For the UK, a study by Zabalza, Pissarides and
Barton (1980) predicted an increase in hours as some men moved from part-time to
full-time work.
The UK abolished its earnings rule in October 1989. This paper assesses the effects of
abolition using the standard ‘differences of differences’ approach.  It shows that the
abolition of this earnings test led to an increase in hours worked by men over pension
age, by about 3 – 4 hours per week. The evidence suggests that the absence of a
positive wealth effect working in the other direction is because the majority of those
who previously chose to defer their pension continue to do so.
The structure of the paper is as follows.  The next section gives details of the UK5
earnings rule and the rules for pension deferral. Section 3 provides a simple model of
the individual’s decisions whether to retire and whether to defer pension receipt.
Section 4 contains evidence on the effect of the abolition of the earnings rule in the
UK on hours and earnings. Section 5 concludes.
State pensions and the earnings rule in the UK
The earnings rule
Before October 1989 men aged 65-69 and women aged 60-64 could only receive the
full basic state pension if they were ‘retired’. This meant they were
1.  Not working
2.  Working, but with earnings (including tax but exclusive of work-related costs)
less than or only occasionally greater than a specified limit.
3.  Working but,
•   only occasionally,
•   to an ‘inconsiderable extent’ (normally less than 12 hours a week)
•   in circumstances ‘not inconsistent with retirement’. This referred to the lightness
of duties, freedom from normal working hours, and other elderly people doing
similar work.
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Failure to meet any of these conditions would result in the individual’s basic state
pension being withdrawn. Initially the rate of withdrawal was 50 per cent for earnings
falling between a specified lower and upper earnings limit. For earnings above the6
upper limit, however, the rate of withdrawal increased to 100 per cent. The upper and
lower limits that operated between 1984 and 1989, together with the rates of the basic
state pension, are summarised in Table 2.








1984-85 £34.69 £65 £69
1985-86 £36.71 £70 £74
1986-87 £38.57 £75 £79
1987-88 £39.50 £75 £79
1988-89 £41.15 £75 £79
1989 £43.60 £75 £79
Deferral
At the time the earnings test was in operation, anyone could choose to defer receipt of
the basic state pension for up to five years at a rate of 7.5 per cent for each year that
they deferred. This rate would be actuarially fair for someone expecting to live 14.3
years beyond the state pension age (assuming no discounting). In fact the life
expectancy for a man aged 65 is 14.267 years (based on the mortality experience of
England and Wales 1990-1992), making deferral roughly actuarially fair for an
average male, assuming that they do not discount the future. For a woman life
expectancy at 60 is 22.079 years. The combination of longer life expectancy and an
earlier state pension age makes deferral actuarially favourable for an average female,
so long as her discount rate is greater than 0.956. It is worth pointing out that since a
married woman without a pension in her own right inherits her husband’s basic state
                                                                                                                                           
2 See Richard Smith and Mark Rowland (1986)7
pension after he is dead, deferral could be actuarially fair for the couple, if not for the
husband.
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Modelling retirement and deferral decisions
What were the options facing a worker when the earnings rule operated?  To analyse
the problem, consider a simple two-period model. In the first period the individual
decides whether to (continue to) work and whether to receive a flat pension – yielding
three possible options. He can retire immediately and start drawing his pension. He
can carry on working and defer pension receipt or he can carry on working and start
drawing his pension, in which case he is subject to an earnings rule.
4 In the second
period, the individual is retired and receives a flat-rate pension, the value of which
depends on the choice made in the first period.
Assume a general utility function;
U = U(Y, Lw | θ  )U Y > 0, UL > 0
where Y is total income in both periods, Lw is leisure (which depends on earnings, w,
in the first period), and θ  is the (individual-specific) probability of surviving until the
second period.
                                                
3 Before 1978 married women could opt to pay a reduced rate of National Insurance which meant they
did not qualify for a basic state pension in their own right, but couples in which one partner does not
qualify would receive a dependant’s addition.
4 We ignore the fourth possible option – retire and defer pension receipt – by assuming no other
available source of income.8
If the individual retires immediately his total income is given by;
(1) Y = p + θβ p
where p is the flat-rate pension and β  is the discount rate.
If he decides to continue to work and defer pension receipt, his income is given by;
(2) Y = w(1 – t) + θβ p(1 + r)
where r is the adjustment of the pension arising from deferral and t is the average rate
of tax which is payable when the individual is working but not when they are retired.
5
If he works, but does not defer pension receipt his total income is;
(3)  Y = w
* + θβ p where
(3i)   w
* = (w + p) (1 – t)  if w < w0
(3ii)  w
* = (w + p(1 – w + w0)) (1 – t) if w0  ≤   w <  w0 + p
(3iii) w
* = w(1 – t) if  w ≥   w0 + p
where the non-linearity in the wage outcome reflects the operation of the earnings
rule.
6
Faced with these different possibilities for total income, what would an individual
choose to do? Certain options can be eliminated fairly easily. For example, the
                                                
5 Pension income is assumed not to be taxed since, in the UK, the value of the individual’s personal tax
allowance is greater than the value of the basic state pension.
6 For simplicity, we ignore the 50 per cent withdrawal rate.9
individual would always choose 3(i) over 3(ii) since ∂ w
*/∂ w = 0 but we might expect
to see a ‘bunching’ of individuals at the kink point w0. Also, a forward-looking
individual should always choose (2) over 3(iii) since the former augments the pension
in period 2 by r.
This reduces the effective choice to (1), (2) and 3(i). The outcome will depend on
relative utility from leisure and income, the discount rate, the survival probability, and
the deferral rate. These last three factors, together with the tax rate if the individual is
working, determine whether deferral is actuarially fair. For someone working this
requires that (1 – t) = θβ r. Note that the tax system tends to favour deferral since all
of the pension is likely to be taxed if the individual receives it now in addition to his
earnings, but no tax will be paid on the additional income received in retirement.
It is possible to distinguish four types of people.
•   Type 1s retire and start drawing their pension immediately. They tend to derive
high utility from leisure relative to additional income and deferral is more likely to
be actuarially unfavourable.
•   Type 2s choose to work and earn at or less than the earnings test limit and start
drawing their pension immediately. For them deferral is likely to be actuarially
unfavourable and they would derive relatively lower utility from any increased
income they could get earning more the earnings rule threshold.
•   Type 3s are those who work and defer pension and for whom deferral is
actuarially favourable.
•   Type 4s are those who work and defer and for whom deferral is actuarially10
unfavourable, but who derive high utility from income relative to leisure and are
therefore prepared to pay the tax implicit in deferring. Note, however, that the
penalty they pay for earning above the earnings rule threshold is less than if there
were no deferral option when they would lose θβ pr in the second period.
If the earnings rule is abolished, (3) becomes;
(3’) Y = (w + p)(1 – t) + θβ p
How does this affect the four types? Type 1s and type 3s will be unaffected. Type 2s
will tend to work more following the abolition of the earnings rule. They will have an
incentive to increase their hours and earnings since ∂ Y/∂ w > 0. Type 4s, for whom
deferral is actuarially unfavourable, will no longer have to defer if the earnings rule is
abolished. They will experience a positive income effect and could choose to reduce
the number of hours worked as a result.
A priori the impact of abolishing the earnings rule on work incentives is ambiguous. It
depends on the relative numbers of people of type 2 and type 4, and on the size of the
implicit tax rate facing type 4s who chose to defer when the earnings rule was in
place. When the government announced the abolition of the earnings rule it claimed
that more than 400,000 people over pensionable age would gain as a result (see
Whitehouse (1991)). This total included 200,000 people who would choose to work
and earn more and 200,000 who would gain because they would no longer have to
defer their pension. Taken literally, these government figures imply a fairly equal split
between people of type 2, who would work more following the abolition of the
earnings rule, and people of type 4 who were previously deferring at an actuarially
unfair rate and who might choose to work less after the abolition of the earnings11
rule. In fact this 200,000 figure for the number of people who would gain from no
longer having to defer their pension seems too high since it is close to the total
number of deferrers and will therefore include some people of type 3.
Given their longer life expectancy, women are more likely than men to be type 3s.
This suggests that the abolition of the earnings rule might have had a differential
impact across the genders. In practice, however, the majority of women would not
have been directly affected by the reform since they had chosen to opt out of the state
pension system altogether. But they may have been indirectly affected by the reform
through its effect on their spouses’ behaviour. There are three possible cases. The first
case is women married to type 2 men, i.e. men who are likely to increase their hours
as a result of the earnings rule being abolished. This will cause a positive income
effect for the wife who, if she is working, is likely to reduce her hours – or stop
working altogether. The second and third cases are both women married to type 4
men, i.e. those for whom deferral is actuarially unfair and who choose to start drawing
their pension once the earnings rule is abolished. The distinction lies in whether the
husbands take account of the lifetime of the couple in assessing whether deferral
would be actuarially unfair, or only their own lifetimes. If the former, then abolishing
the earnings rule and allowing the husband to draw the pension immediately will have
a positive income effect for both spouses. If the latter, then there may be some wives
who experience a fall in their total incomes following the abolition of the earnings
rule if their husbands choose not to defer. For members of this third group the
abolition of the earnings rule has a negative income effect which could cause them to
increase their hours of work. If they do not, then abolition of the earnings rule could
in the longer term, generate higher levels of poverty among elderly widows.12
The effect of abolishing the earnings rule
To evaluate the effect of abolishing the earnings rule we compare the change in hours
and earnings of men aged 65-69 and women aged 60-64 before and after the reform
with the change in the same variables over the same period of two comparison groups.
The first consists of men and women five years before state pension age (i.e. men
aged 60-64 and women aged 55-59) who remained ineligible for the state pension
throughout. The second consists of older men aged 70-74 and women aged 65-69 who
could receive the state pension without being subject to earnings rule throughout. The
purpose of the comparison groups is to control for the potential effect of macro-
factors as well as other policy measures that might have affected hours and earnings
before and after the reform.
7
To identify the effect of the reform from such a differences-in-differences approach
two conditions must be satisfied.
8 First, the composition of the groups must be stable
across time and second, the control and treatment group must be subject to (and react
in the same way to) macro trends. The first condition is potentially violated if there
are any spillover effects from the reform to the control groups. This is an issue for
members of the younger control group who might change their labour market
behaviour in anticipation of no longer having to face the earnings rule when they
reach state pension age. A second potential problem with the younger control group is
that the balance between full-time and part-time workers is quite different in the
                                                
7 It is worth pointing out that the biggest work incentive effects for older workers are likely to be
generated by occupational pension schemes. However, we should capture any changes in the incentives
generated by these schemes by including the younger and older control groups.13
younger male cohort compared to the treatment group and is much more similar in the
treatment group and the older cohort. Since full-time and part-time workers might be
differentially affected by macro factors, this also will tend to make the younger cohort
a less valid control. Nevertheless because of relatively small sample sizes for the older
control group, we present results including the younger control group for comparison.
Data
The data are taken from the Family Expenditure Survey from April 1984 – March
1994. The FES contains reliable and consistent information on employment status,
hours worked and earnings that will allow us to look at employment before and after
the abolition of the earnings rule. Also, the FES contains information on individuals’
state pension income that will allow us to make some assessment of the extent to
which individuals defer pension receipt. Table 3 shows the sample sizes for the
‘treatment’ group and the two ‘control’ groups. Among the older age groups
participation rates are very low and pooling across a number of years is necessary to
increase sample sizes when looking at hours and earnings.
Table 3 Sample sizes
Pre-reform Post-reform
All Employed All Employed
Treatment Men aged 65-69 2111 160 1713 128
Control 1 Men aged 60-64 2185 888 1558 511
Control 2 Men aged 70-74 1573 77 1371 67
Treatment Women aged 60-64 2697 450 1916 338
Control 1 Women aged 55-59 2399 1125 1718 838
Control 2 Women aged 65-69 2576 134 2017 119
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issues.1415
Pre-reform
The earnings rule as it operated in the UK contained a number of potential
ambiguities. For example, it combined an hours rule with an earnings rule and it
allowed for people whose earnings were ‘occasionally greater’ than the earnings rule
limits to receive a full basic state pension. Also, work-related costs could be taken
into consideration when defining relevant earnings, including for example the cost of
dry-cleaning clothes used for work. All these factors could make the earnings rule a
less than binding constraint in practice – and also make it harder to identify an effect
from its abolition.
Table 4 provides evidence on how binding the earnings rule was in practice. It shows
the proportion of men in receipt of state pension income at least as great as the basic
state pension. It shows that the earnings threshold was more binding than the limit on
hours – a far smaller proportion of men who earned more than the earnings rule
threshold received state pension income equal to the full basic state pension than of
men who worked more than twelve hours. However, more than one-fifth of men
earning more than the earnings limit did receive as much state pension income as the
full basic state pension, although this proportion falls once we allow for weekly work-
related costs of £5, £10 and £20. This may reflect receipt of income in the form of the
secondary state pension, SERPS, which was not subject to the earnings limit and
which can not be separated from total state pension income in the FES.16
Table 4 Proportion of men receiving the full basic state pension
Men aged 65-69 Pre-reform
Hours rule
Worked < 12 hours a week 0.9348
Worked >= 12 hours a week 0.6934
Earnings rule
Earned < upper limit 0.9549
Earned > upper limit 0.2200
Earned > (upper limit + £5) 0.1702
Earned > (upper limit + £10) 0.1333
Earned > (upper limit + £20) 0.1250
Figure 1 plots the distribution of earnings for men aged 65-69 and women aged 60-64
when the earnings rule was in place. We focus on the period after April 1986 since
from this time the earnings rule thresholds were unchanged (see Table 2). The
earnings rule did appear to have had some impact on earnings for men and women.
The allowance for work-related costs in the earnings rule, but not our definition of
earnings, will tend to have a smoothing effect on any potential ‘kink’ in the
distribution of earnings at the threshold. Even so, there is some bunching in the
distribution of male and female earnings around the £75 threshold, although in neither
case is the mass of the distribution to be found around these points. The largest spikes
in the distributions of male and female earnings occur around £40 a week, reflecting
the Lower Earnings Limit for National Insurance contributions.
9
<<Figure 1 near here>>
                                                
9 Although men and women over the state pension do not have to pay employee’s National Insurance
contributions, the fact that employers are liable for employer’s NI means that the LEL is still important
even after state pension ages.17
Post-reform
Table 5 summarizes participation rates and average hours for the treatment and
control groups before and after abolition of the earnings rule. The only significant
change in participation occurs for the younger men. The fall in employment among
this group – and the likely effect of this on the composition of the sample of workers
in this age range – poses further potential problems for using younger workers as a
control group in looking at hours and earnings.
The evidence suggests that the abolition of the earnings rule had a significant effect
on the number of hours worked by men in the treatment group. A Wilcoxon rank-sum
test rejects the null that the two distributions are independent samples from
populations with the same distribution. Also, the average number of hours worked by
men in the treatment group increased significantly, by nearly four hours per worker –
compared to no significant change in average hours, or in the distribution of hours,
among the older or younger cohort over the same period.
Table 5 Participation and hours, before and after the reform
Participation (%) Mean hours (>0) Rank sum
Pre Post Pre Post test (hours)
Men 65-69 7.58 7.47 22.43 26.27** 2.266
Men 60-64 40.64 32.80** 40.62 40.35 0.560
Men 70-74 4.90 4.89 17.81 18.40 1.041
Women 60-64 16.39 17.64 21.06 22.89* 1.611
Women 55-59 46.89 48.78 27.09 27.06 0.407
Women 65-69 5.20 5.90 15.32 16.59 0.802
** change significant at 5% level; * change significant at the 10% level
This is confirmed by regression analysis. We regress weekly hours for individuals in
the three groups on a set of dummies for the treatment and younger control groups18
and a dummy for the period after the abolition of the earnings test. We include an
interaction term that takes the value one for the treatment group in the post-reform
period to pick up any differential change in the hours of the treatment group after the
reform relative to the two control groups. We control for education, marital status,
presence of children in the household and spouse’s age, employment and education.
The results are summarised in the first column of Table 6. With two control groups,
we find a significant increase in the average number of weekly hours – around four
hours a week – among the treatment group after the reform. Excluding the younger
control group there is still an increase of around three hours per week, but the smaller
sample size increases the standard error.
Table 6 Regression results (men)
OLS – hours worked per
week
Probit – worked more
than 40 hrs
OLS – weekly earnings
Control groups Older and
younger
Older only Older and
younger






















































No. obs 1831 432 1831 432 1831 432
R-squared 0.3381 0.0991 0.1960 0.1643
Log likelihood -1108.9 -161.7
These regressions control for education, marital status, presence of children in the household, spouse’s
age, employment and education
Earnings are adjusted by a wage index calculated using FES data for male employees aged 20-64
Table 6 also shows the marginal effects from a probit regression on whether or not the
individual works 40 or more hours a week. There is a significant increase in the19
proportion of men in the treatment group working more than 40 hours a week after the
reform even compared against the older control group only. This is consistent with the
predictions of Zabalza et al (1980) of a shift from part-time to full-time employment
following the abolition of the earnings rule. The final column of Table 6 summarises
the results of a regression of earnings on the same variables and shows a positive and
significant increase in the earnings of the treatment group after the reform compared
to the control groups.
Table 7 Regression results (women)
OLS – hours worked per
week
Probit – worked more
than 30 hrs
OLS – weekly earnings
Control groups Older and
younger
Older only Older and
younger




















































No. obs 2694 984 2694 984 2694 984
R-squared .1205 .0600 0.1472 0.1125
Log likelihood -1681.54 -546.48
These regressions control for education, marital status, presence of children in the household, spouse’s
age, employment and education
Earnings are adjusted by a wage index calculated using FES data for female employees aged 20-59
The results for women are less conclusive. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test fails to reject
that the distributions of hours are the same before and after the reform, but there is an
increase in the average number of hours worked among the treatment group which is
significant at the 10 per cent level (see Table 5). The results of regression analysis
(reported in Table 7) show an increase in average weekly hours for the treatment20
group in the post-reform period, compared to the younger and older control groups.
But the coefficient disappears once we omit the younger control group. There is also
no significant increase in the proportion of women in the treatment group working
thirty hours or more a week
10 compared to the older control and no significant change
in earnings. The fact that the results for women are inconclusive may reflect the fact
that the majority of married women are only indirectly affected by the abolition of the
earnings rule. Small sample sizes mean that we are unable to perform separate
regressions for married and single women.
Deferral
There is little evidence of any reduction in employment that might have been caused
by the positive wealth effect for people of type 4 (i.e. those who previously chose to
work and defer at an actuarially unfair rate). One possible explanation is that for most
people who chose to defer their pension, deferral was actuarially favourable. In this
case, however, we would not expect to see a large fall in the number of people who
choose to defer after the reform. Figure 2 provides some evidence to support this. It
shows cohort profiles of the proportion of men who received increments to their
pension as a result of deferral from the official statistics. The cohorts are defined
according to the year in which people reach the state pension age. The oldest is those
who reached 65 in 1980. At younger ages, the cohort profiles rise. This reflects
increasing numbers of people who retire after the state pension age and begin to
receive their deferred pension. The increase in observed deferrals at older ages is
likely to reflect the effects of differential mortality. There is a gradual decline in
                                                
10 We choose this lower threshold since so few women work 40 hours a week or more.21
deferral across successive cohorts, but no evidence of a structural break after the
abolition of the earnings test.
<<Figure 2 near here>>
Conclusions
A simple differences in differences analysis shows that the abolition had a positive
effect on the hours and earnings of men, although the evidence for women is
inconclusive. Among men in the affected age range there was an increase of between
3 – 4 hours per week. To get some idea of the magnitude of this effect, an earnings
response of this size would generate additional tax revenue for the government of
around £20 million per year (in 1989 prices).
There is no evidence of any reduction in hours that would arise as a result of a
positive wealth effect from abolishing the earnings test. One possible explanation is
that for most of those who chose to defer deferral was actuarially fair. Support for this
hypothesis comes from the fact that there is little indication of a significant reduction
in deferral after the earnings test was abolished.22
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